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Abstract 
 Many studies have found that changing people’s emotions will change their moral 
judgments. I examined whether people who can skillfully differentiate between emotional states 
recognize and disregard irrelevant emotions and pay more attention to relevant emotions while 
making moral judgments. In experiment I did not find that individual differences in emotional 
differentiation moderated the relationship between disgust and subsequent moral judgments. 
Further examination of the data suggested consistency effects where participants used previous 
moral judgments to inform current moral judgments. In exploratory analyses that attempted to 
control for consistency effects, I found that participants were more lenient when primed with 
relevant disgust than neutral primes, suggesting a contrast effect. Future studies plan to expand 
the set of target behaviors to avoid such consistency effects.  
Keywords: morality, emotion differentiation, intuition, affect misattribution, disgust 
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Relevance of Emotions in Morality: Emotion Differentiation Moderates Influence of Disgust on 
Moral Judgments 
For many years, the traditional view in moral psychology was that people form moral 
judgments through rational processes involving calculated deliberation (Narvaez & Lapsley, 
2005). In philosophical thought, many philosophers ranging from Immanuel Kant to John Rawls 
argue that moral requirements are based on standards of rationality (Kant, 1959; Rawls, 1971). 
Rationalists often approach the subject of morality by stressing “the power of a priori reason to 
grasp substantial truths about the world” (William, 1967, p. 69). Such emphasis was given to 
reason because most viewed passions as a negative force in human behavior, leading to 
erroneous conclusions and biased thought. The influence of these rationalist ideas pervaded 
during the cognitive revolution of the 1950s and 1960s where landmark figures Jean Piaget 
(1932/1965) and Lawrence Kohlberg (1969) proposed rational developmental models for how 
children learn right from wrong. Kohlberg argues moral development stems from experience in 
perspective taking, or the process of mentally placing oneself in other people’s place. As children 
improve perspective taking abilities they improve their moral reasoning which drives moral 
judgment (Mason & Gibbs, 1993).  
However, some philosophical theories of morality went so far as to say reason is a slave 
to the passions (Hume, 1739/2000). In the past decade a growing consensus from empirical 
studies suggests emotions are critical to the moral judgment process (Greene & Haidt 2002; 
Prinz, 2007). Strong evidence for this view comes from studies showing that manipulating 
emotions can influence moral judgment. Wheatley and Haidt (2005) showed that post-hypnotic 
suggestions inducing disgust caused participants to judge moral actions more severely. 
Environmentally inducing disgust through cues such as a dirty desk or noxious odors can 
increase the severity of moral judgments (Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008). Conversely, 
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researchers have found inducing positive affect can alleviate moral judgments (Valdesolo & 
DeSteno, 2006). In sharp contrast to the rationalist position, this emotion-based view posited that 
right and wrong is more often felt than thought.  
I suspect that emotions provide vital information when making decisions (see Clore, 
Schwarz & Conway, 1994; Frank, 2011; Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch 2001), but the 
usefulness of this information depends on the type of emotion. At the broadest level, emotions 
can be separated into two categories: integral and incidental. Integral emotions are those that are 
clearly related to the decision at hand and arise in response to the thing one is judging – in this 
case, a moral transgression (Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). Findings in evolutionary psychology 
support the view that integral emotions are necessary in understanding human morality (Pinker, 
1997; Trivers, 1971).  Feeling shame or guilt is usually a good indicator that you mistreated 
someone. In contrast, incidental emotions arise from factors unrelated to the moral transgression 
and can be considered irrelevant to subsequent judgment of that behavior (Doris & Stich, 2005). 
For example, researchers had participants judge controversial cultural practices (e.g. 
cannibalism) while an artificially induced noxious odor is present. Feelings of disgust evoked 
from the controversial practice itself would be integral while any disgust elicited by the noxious 
odor would be incidental. When making judgments in the presence of the noxious odor 
participants misattributed their feelings of incidental disgust as feelings of integral disgust 
toward the controversial practice itself (Schnall et al., 2008). Unlike integral emotions, incidental 
emotions provide little justification for moral decisions yet can highly influence people’s moral 
judgments. 
In this paper I examine two hypotheses related to individual differences in emotional 
experiences. First, I hypothesize that individuals skilled in emotion differentiation will resist the 
RELEVANCE OF EMOTIONS IN MORALITY                                                                        5 
 
influence of incidental disgust on moral judgments. Second, I hypothesize that skilled emotion 
differentiators will rely more heavily on integral disgust toward transgressions when making 
moral judgments about those transgressions. Individuals able to differentiate their emotions into 
discrete states may be able to recognize the source of their emotions and avoid using irrelevant 
emotions and rely more on relevant emotions during moral decisions. This study will address the 
extent to which emotion differentiation plays a role in moral judgments.  
Process Models of Moral Judgment 
 Critiques of the rationalist approach to moral psychology emerged under the heading of 
the social intuitionist model. The model argues that quick, intuitive feelings drive moral 
judgments (Haidt, 2001). This theory is supported by developments in ‘automaticity’ – the 
mind’s ability to solve problems unconsciously and automatically (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). 
Studies demonstrate that not only do participants have automatic reactions, but also they 
frequently use them as guides when making judgments and decisions (Schwarz & Clore, 1983). 
Drawing on research on automaticity and unconscious processes, the social intuitionist model 
suggests judgments about moral issues are similar to aesthetic judgments: we hear or see 
something and have an instant feeling of approval or disapproval (Haidt, 2001). While Haidt’s 
(2001) model allows for reasoning and reflection, it argues that people typically rationalize their 
initial gut reactions. While the model may underplay the role of reasoning, some studies find 
people use reasoning as a post hoc justification for intuitive reactions of anger toward people 
who violate taboos (Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 2007). Studies of emotion priming before moral 
judgment tasks have been taken as evidence in support of the social intuitionist model.  
 While researchers have argued for both rationalist and intuitionist models, others have 
supported dual-process models of moral judgment, in which emotion intuitions come first 
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(System 1) but can be overridden by reflection and reasoning (System 2; Greene, Morelli, 
Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008). Studies that support this model show that people 
sometimes override intuitions when presented with utilitarian style dilemmas (e.g. Trolley 
Dilemma; Foot, 2002) which pit intuition against deliberative reasoning (Greene et al., 2008). In 
the Trolley Dilemma participants are presented with choosing one of two inevitable choices: let a 
train kill 1 person or kill 5 people. Participants are pressured to violate their moral intuitions (e.g. 
do not kill) to uphold a utilitarian principle. Although intuitions can strongly influence 
participants’ moral judgments, these intuitions can be overridden by reason in some contexts. 
Further critiques of the social intuitionist model by Pizarro and Bloom (2003) note how other 
processes such as cognitive appraisal can affect moral intuitions. The authors note how changing 
one’s thoughts or appraisals about an issue can change the emotions one feels. The more general 
point they make is that emotional skills such as emotional awareness and emotion regulation 
could change moral decisions. The current study follows up on Pizarro and Bloom’s suggestions 
and examines how emotion differentiation could moderate the relationship between emotions 
and moral judgment.  
Emotion Differentiation  
Narvaez and Lapsley (2005) have suggested that people can develop a type of expertise 
in awareness of their emotional processes. They argue that this expertise exists as a continuum 
between novice status and expert status where emotional reactions can be labeled as “naïve” or 
“educated” (Narvaez, 2010). People with more expertise about their emotions may be better able 
to discern morally relevant factors of a situation. These people may be more likely to ignore 
incidental emotions when making moral judgments as well as more likely to utilize relevant 
emotions.  
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 Previous research in moral psychology focused on individual differences to sensitivity to 
gut feelings. Schnall et al. (2008) used the Private Body Consciousness scale (PBC) as a measure 
of people’s attention to internal physical states. Their research found that experiencing incidental 
disgust from external sources (e.g. dirty desk or noxious odor) increases the severity of people’s 
moral judgments only for those high in PBC. Their conclusion was that the physical disgust 
created by external sources was interpreted as social disgust toward the moral transgressions for 
those people who attend to their visceral reactions. While a person may be very good at focusing 
attention to visceral body sensations, such skill is separate from whether they can distinguish 
precisely what emotion they are feeling. My study focuses on individual differences in the ability 
to distinguish between emotional states, not attending to internal sensations.  
 Emotion differentiation is a skill that was developed as part of constructionist theories of 
emotion. Recent work in constructionist model of emotions suggests emotions are not 
biologically given and fixed categories (e.g. Ekman, 1972), but are emergent products of core 
affect (valence plus arousal) and conceptual knowledge of emotions (Lindquist & Barrett, 2008; 
Schachter & Singer, 1962). In this view, a discrete emotion emerges in consciousness when core 
affect is categorized as having emotional meaning. A large portion of what it is to be successful 
at differentiating emotional states is to have more refined conceptual knowledge of emotions. 
Skilled emotional differentiators are able to use discrete words (e.g., “anger” and “sad”) to 
represent two distinct states of core affect. Individuals who are poor in emotion differentiation 
use those words in nonspecific ways to represent broader affective dimensions such as valence 
(e.g. “feels bad”).  
 Research in emotion differentiation reveals that greater emotional complexity is 
advantageous and may lead to better decisions. Greater dialecticism, or the ability to report 
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emotion experiences in both positive and negative emotions, is associated with greater resilience 
and lower stress (Ong & Bergeman, 2004). Barrett et al. (2001) show that greater emotion 
granularity allows more flexible emotion regulation. Studies of children’s experience of 
emotions reveal that children who are better at verbalizing their emotion experiences suffer less 
from depression than children who have difficulty verbalizing their emotions (e.g. Rieffe et al., 
2007). I want to examine if greater emotion differentiation may allow individuals to resist the 
influence of irrelevant factors in moral judgments. In this regard, greater emotion differentiation 
may lead to more accurate moral judgments across contexts (e.g. dirty desks or noxious odors) 
that would usually affect people’s moral judgments.  
 In the current study, I use an affective priming task developed by Cameron, Payne, & 
Doris (2013) based on Payne et al. (2005)’s affect misattribution procedure. These procedures 
used a priming task where participants are exposed to disgust images that evoke an emotional 
reaction. After viewing the prime, participants are asked to make moral judgments about various 
behaviors. The priming procedure found that people mistake affect caused by the prime for 
feelings toward the target of judgment; in this task, the disgust prime evokes incidental disgust 
whereas the target behavior elicits integral disgust. Cameron et al. (2013) found that incidental 
disgust only increased the strength of moral judgments for people who could not clearly 
differentiate their emotions, suggesting that skilled emotion differentiators had the ability to 
discount disgust that was irrelevant for moral judgments.  
 Cameron and colleagues (2013) also examined whether skilled emotion differentiators 
were more reliant on integral disgust felt toward the moral violations themselves. Based upon 
norming data of how disgusting the different target violations were, they found that skilled 
emotion differentiators’ moral judgments were more strongly correlated with prior disgust norms 
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for the behaviors in question, suggesting greater reliance on integral disgust. However, because 
that analysis was only correlational, it remains unclear whether manipulating relevance of 
disgust experimentally would produce similar effects.  
 My study is a continuation on Cameron et al. (2013), as I manipulate the relevance of the 
disgust prime to change whether the primed disgust is incidental or integral to the violation being 
judged. I created a single relevant disgust prime for each target behavior by matching content 
between the two (e.g. a picture of a man with a beat up face is relevant when judging the 
immorality of punching a homeless person). I defined disgust primes as irrelevant when they did 
not match the conceptual content of the moral transgression. By definition, disgust primes evoke 
integral emotions when that image is conceptually related to the moral transgression and 
irrelevant disgust primes evoke incidental emotions when that image is conceptually unrelated to 
the moral transgression.  
I predicted that individuals high in emotion differentiation would ignore or be able to 
regulate incidental emotions created by irrelevant disgust primes (as in Cameron et al., 2013). 
This hypothesis would replicate the finding by Cameron et al. (2013) that emotion differentiation 
moderates the influence of disgust primes on target behaviors, and extend it to a modified 
version of their paradigm. This experiment also manipulated the relevance of disgust primes, 
rather than simply measuring the disgust ratings by participants, so I also predict that individuals 
skilled in emotion differentiation will utilize integral emotions more so than individuals with 
poor emotion differentiation skills. These individuals may be able to identify the relevant 
emotions in a moral situation and use them appropriately.  
Method 
Participants 
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 I recruited 73 participants (28 female, 45 male) from the University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill for course credit. I excluded 1 participant who pressed the same key on all priming 
task trials. 
Design 
 The experiment had a 3-group (prime image: relevant disgust, irrelevant disgust, neutral) 
within-participant design and emotion differentiation was treated as a moderating variable.  
Procedure  
 After being seated at computer stations, participants completed an affective priming task. 
Prime stimuli were disgusting or neutral images drawn from Internet searches as well as the 
International Affect Picture System (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2005). Target stimuli were solid 
rectangles containing short text descriptions of moral transgressions accumulated from past 
research on moral judgment (see Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 2007; Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, & 
Cohen, 2009; Moral Foundations Sacredness Scale as cited in Mikulincer & Shaver, 2011; 
Rozin, Lowery, Sumio, 1999). Each description was of a practice generally considered wrong in 
American society, although some items were more morally ambiguous (e.g. “A person is 
sexually promiscuous”) than others (e.g. “A person kicks a dog in the head, hard”). These 
descriptions were shortened to brief phrases to be well suited for the priming task. I included 10 
target behaviors that have been previously rated as being “harm violations” (that involve 
harming other sentient beings) and 10 target behaviors that have been previously rated as being 
“purity violations” (that seem to be less about harm, and more about violating spiritual/bodily 
purity). The target behaviors are listed in Appendix A. I determined corresponding relevant 
disgust primes for target behaviors by similarity of content between the target behaviors and 
primes. For example, if the target behavior was kicking a cat, then the relevant prime image 
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contained a disgusting picture of a cat. Irrelevant disgust primes were those images that had no 
substantive content overlap with the target behavior. For example, a picture of a dirty bathroom 
would be an irrelevant disgust prime for the target behavior of kicking a cat. For a given target 
behavior, irrelevant disgust primes were randomly selected from a set of disgusting images that 
did not include relevant images for the given class of behaviors (harm v. purity). This meant that 
a relevant disgust prime for one harm-related behavior (i.e., kicking a dog) could not serve as an 
irrelevant disgust prime for a similar harm-related behavior (i.e., kicking a cat). As a control, I 
included neutral primes (see Appendix B) from the International Affective Picture System 
(IAPS). These are all images that had been normed as not eliciting a strong emotion reaction of 
any valence.  
 In light of criticisms that harm and purity may not be separable dimensions of moral 
evaluation (Gray, Waytz, & Young, 2012), I resist making strong interpretations about these as 
separate moral foundations (e.g. Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). Additionally, I did not find 
that target behavior type made a difference for moral evaluation (hence, behavior type is not 
treated as a factor in the analyses below). Nonetheless, primes were determined to be relevant or 
irrelevant based upon content match between prime image and target behavior. Thus, I can still 
test whether emotion differentiation moderates reliance on relevant versus irrelevant disgust 
without making strong claims about separate moral foundations.  
 On a given trial, the prime stimulus appeared on the screen for 100 milliseconds before 
disappearing. After 100 milliseconds into the trial, the target stimulus appeared for 1500 
milliseconds before being replaced by a black and white masking stimulus. At this point, a 
prompt designed to measure moral absolutism appeared at the bottom of the screen: “To what 
degree is the behavior morally wrong regardless of the culture in which it is practiced?” 
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(emphasis in original). Answers were on a scale from 1=Not at all to 4=Extremely: a response of 
1 was indicated as lowest in moral absolutism while a 4 was highest. Before the priming task, 
subjects were instructed as follows:  
“We would like you to work on a short computer task. We will show you pairs of images 
and statements on the computer screen. You will see a photo of a real-life image. You 
will also read a short statement about a real-life cultural practice. These practices are 
drawn from the Human Relations Area File, a database compiled by anthropologists and 
sociologists documenting existing cultural norms. On each trial of the task you will be 
asked one question. You will be asked whether the cultural practice is morally wrong 
regardless of the culture in which it occurs. Some cultures have different perspectives on 
what is morally right and wrong. In answering this question, consider whether this 
cultural practice is morally wrong despite such cultural differences. You will be asked to 
report your answer using a 4-point scale where 1=Not at all and 4=Extremely.” 
Participants were also told to avoid the influence of the primes:  
“It is important to note that photos can sometime bias people’s judgments about other 
things. We are interested in studying how people can avoid being biased by the photos, so 
please try your absolute best not to let the photos influence your judgments of the cultural 
practices! Give us an honest assessment of the cultural statements, regardless of the 
images that precede them.”  
Participants completed two practice trials before proceeding to the priming task. In the priming 
task each target behavior was displayed three times: once with a relevant disgust prime, once 
with a randomly chosen irrelevant disgust prime, and once with a randomly chosen neutral 
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prime. In total, the priming task contained 60 trials. Prior to the beginning of the priming task, 
participants were encouraged to respond as quickly as possible.  
 I measured individual differences in emotion differentiation using both an operative 
measure and a self-report measure. For the operative measure of emotion differentiation, I had 
participants respond to 10 scenarios from the Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale (Lane et al., 
1990). These scenarios described emotional situations in everyday life that might elicit a variety 
of emotions, such as a friend winning a prize you were competing for, an unappreciative spouse, 
and the death of a loved one. For each scenario, participants were asked to judge the degree to 
which they felt each of six discrete emotions (1=Not at all to 4=Extremely): anger, sadness, 
anxiety, boredom, disappointment, and embarrassment. I computed emotion differentiation as the 
intra-class correlation coefficient between the emotional responses across all scenarios (Shrout & 
Fleiss, 1979). Higher intra-class correlations represent lower levels of emotion differentiation, as 
participants used distinct emotion terms in the same way to describe how they feel. For unskilled 
emotion differentiators, the terms “anger”, “sadness”, “anxiety”, “disappointment”, “boredom”, 
and “embarrassment” will be represented in indiscriminate ways: negative valence or “feeling 
bad.” By contrast, lower correlations suggest participants were more discriminating in their use 
of emotion terms to capture their affect experiences.  
 To measure self-reported emotion differentiation, I had participants complete the 14-item 
Range and Differentiation of Emotional Experience Scale (Kang & Shaver, 2005). The scale 
assesses the degree to which people believe that they experience a broad range of emotional 
states. Items included “I experience a wide range of emotions” and “Each emotion has a very 
distinct and unique meaning to me.” Past work suggests that these two measures of emotion 
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differentiation may not correlate, due to lack of self-insight about emotional skills and 
desirability biases (Lindquist & Barrett, 2008).  
 Participants also reported their gender, socioeconomic class, and political orientation. I 
included three exploratory measures: the 36-item Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale 
(Gratz & Roemer, 2004), the 27-item Disgust Sensitivity Scale (Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin, 
1994), and the 32-item Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). 
Because these measures did not moderate the primary analyses, I do not discuss these further.   
Results 
 I predicted that incidental disgust would increase the strength of moral judgments only 
for unskilled emotion differentiators. Furthermore, I predicted that integral disgust would 
increase the strength of moral judgments more so for skilled emotion differentiators. Preliminary 
correlational analysis revealed no correlation between the operative and self-report measures of 
emotion differentiation, r(70) = .07, p = .56. This suggests people may be unable to accurately 
report their skill at emotion differentiation.  
With this in mind, I found that self-reported emotion differentiation predicted harsher 
moral judgments in all three prime conditions: relevant disgust primes, r(70) = .27, p = .02, 
irrelevant disgust primes, r(70) = .21, p = .08, and neutral primes, r(70) = .31, p = .01. However, 
operative emotion differentiation did not predict moral judgments in any of the prime conditions: 
relevant disgust primes, r(70) = .01, p = .96, irrelevant disgust primes, r(70) = .09, p = .48, or 
neutral primes, r(70) = .20, p = .84. These results suggest that simply the perception of being a 
skilled emotion differentiator is correlated with harsher moral judgments. This is consistent with 
Koven’s (2011) finding that perceived emotion differentiation predicts stronger deontological 
moral judgments in dilemmas that pit deontological rules against utilitarian outcomes (e.g. 
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killing one person to save five people). Gohm (2003) suggests that individuals who perceive 
higher emotion differentiation react strongly to negative stimuli and maintain negative moods 
longer. It seems possible that individuals in the study who reported high emotion differentiation 
may have experienced stronger emotional reactions in response to moral transgressions, leading 
to harsher moral judgments for target behaviors overall.  
I hypothesized that compared to unskilled differentiators, skilled emotion differentiators 
would show reduced influence of irrelevant disgust on moral judgment, and increased influence 
of relevant disgust on their moral judgments. I conducted a repeated measures analysis of 
variance examining the influence of prime type on moral judgment, and modeled the interaction 
with the emotion differentiation measures. I conducted separate analyses with the operative and 
self-report measures of emotion differentiation as moderators. Prime type did not influence 
moral judgments overall, F(1, 70) = .89, p = .41. Table 1 shows the means and standard 
deviations of moral judgments within each prime condition. There was not a priming effect in the 
current paradigm. More importantly, I found no significant interaction between operative 
emotion differentiation and prime type, F(1, 70) = 1.76, p = .18.  
These results are in contrast to Cameron, Payne, and Doris (2013)’s finding that operative 
emotion differentiation moderated irrelevant disgust priming of moral judgments. One potential 
reason for the discrepancy between prior findings and these results is the influence of 
consistency effects. Unlike prior research, I presented each target behavior three times to pair 
with the three prime types. Judging the target behavior multiple times could have led participants 
to use past judgments to influence current judgments. Another reason may be that the current 
paradigm is different from that used by Cameron et al. (2013). I presented the prime stimuli for a 
shorter period of time and the target stimuli for a longer period of time than in Cameron et al. 
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(2013). I had done this to allow the relevance or irrelevance of the disgust prime to be easier to 
find when compared to the target behavior. This could be explained through findings of Payne et 
al. (2005) that increased target duration leads to a statistical reduction in strength of the priming 
effect. I initially conducted pilot testing to determine relevant and irrelevant prime images for the 
behaviors used by Cameron et al. (2013), but was unable to find consistent results distinguishing 
relevant versus irrelevant primes. That is why I developed the new paradigm. These limitations 
may account for the lack of interaction between emotion differentiation and prime type.  
 Next, I conducted the same analysis with self-reported emotion differentiation as the 
moderator instead of operative emotion differentiation. Analysis again showed no overall 
priming effect, F(1,70) = .99, p = .37. However, there was a significant interaction between self-
reported emotion differentiation and the priming manipulation, F (1,70) = 3.56, p = .03. To 
investigate this interaction further, I conducted pairwise comparisons between prime conditions 
at high and low levels of self-reported emotion differentiation to examine what was driving this 
interaction. For unskilled emotion differentiators, there was not an influence of prime type on 
moral judgments. By contrast, skilled emotion differentiation showed a marginally significant 
difference in moral judgments between relevant primes and irrelevant primes (Mean difference = 
0.48, p = .08) and a significant difference for neutral primes versus irrelevant primes (Mean 
difference = 0.53, p = .03). Table 2 shows the estimated marginal means of self-reported emotion 
differentiation by prime type. While the mean differences for low perceived emotion 
differentiation were insignificant, the mean differences for people high in self-reported emotion 
differentiation show that moral judgments primed with irrelevant disgust were more lenient 
compared to the other two prime conditions. This may reflect a contrast effect, in which people 
who are higher in perceived emotion differentiation are over-correcting their responses when 
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primed with irrelevant disgust. Self-reported emotion differentiation was marginally correlated 
with the difference score of moral judgments for relevant versus irrelevant primes, r(70) = .21, p 
= .08, suggesting that self-reported emotion differentiation was associated with stronger moral 
judgments for relevant-disgust versus irrelevant-disgust trials. Self-reported emotion 
differentiation was also correlated with the difference score for moral judgments between 
irrelevant trials versus neutral trials, r(70) = -.32, p = .01, suggesting that self-reported emotion 
differentiation was associated with weaker moral judgments for irrelevant-disgust trials versus 
neutral trials. This supports my hypothesis in part because it shows that people who perceived 
themselves to be skilled emotion differentiators could recognize irrelevant disgust and in some 
way compensate for that disgust by reducing the intensity of their moral judgment. However, 
because a similar effect was not found for operative emotion differentiation – and because of 
inherent limitations of self-report measures of emotional intelligence – it is not entirely clear 
what conclusion to draw from this finding.  
    Given the failure to replicate prior results by Cameron and colleagues (2013) with this 
new paradigm, I conducted exploratory analyses to try to account for consistency effects. 
Judging the same target behavior multiple times may have led to participants responding in 
similar ways despite the difference in the prime type. In support of this claim, I found that 
judgments on each of the three sets of trials were correlated to an extremely high degree (r’s > 
.90). In my exploratory analysis, I examined the first instance of each target behavior for 
participants. By including only the first instance of all 20 target behaviors, I avoided the 
possibility for participants to use prior instances of the specific target behavior to influence their 
current ratings.  
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A repeated measures ANOVA revealed an overall priming effect, but it was in the 
opposite direction from what was predicted, F(1,70) = 3.47, p = .03. Table 3 shows the estimated 
marginal means and standard deviations of the post hoc analysis. Post hoc analysis revealed that 
people made more lenient judgments on relevant disgust trials compared to neutral trials, p < .05, 
but all other simple comparisons were non-significant. Operative emotion differentiation did not 
moderate this priming effect, F(1,70) = .30, p = .74, nor did self-reported emotion differentiation, 
F(1,70) = .46, p = .63. I speculate that this contrast effect may be due to the way relevance was 
determined. In my instructions to participants, I asked participants to ignore the influence of the 
prime images to establish implicit influence (Payne et al., 2005). However, the relevance may 
have served as a cue to participants to remind them that they should ignore the influence of this 
image. For instance, if a person sees a disgusting-looking dog before judging whether kicking a 
dog is morally wrong, the content similarity between the prime and target may remind people of 
the need to disregard disgust prime influence. Because prime relevance may have served as a 
salient cue to avoid prime influence, emotion differentiation may not have been required to 
engage in response correction. 
Discussion 
 The results from the experiment are unexpected but still interpretable. I failed to replicate 
the emotional priming effect predicted by the social intuitionist model (Haidt, 2001). The lack of 
an overall priming effect is also surprising given the affect misattribution procedure is robust in a 
variety of contexts (Payne et al., 2005) and because disgust priming revealed in a somewhat 
similar paradigm in prior work (Cameron et al., 2013). Furthermore, I failed to find an 
interaction between prime type and emotion differentiation. My primary focus was on the 
indirect measure of emotion differentiation because it seems unlikely people accurately know if 
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they are skilled emotion differentiators, and because this is what moderated disgust priming of 
moral judgments in prior studies (Cameron et al., 2013). Operative and self-reported measures of 
emotion differentiation may be capturing two different constructs because the correlation 
between the two was very low (r = 0.07, p = .56). Whereas operative measures provide an 
objective score of emotion differentiation, self-reported measures report the perception of being 
a skilled emotion differentiator.    
With this in mind, the significant interaction between perceived emotion differentiation 
and prime type is difficult to interpret. The results show that participants who perceived 
themselves to be skilled emotion differentiators made more lenient judgments only on target 
behaviors primed with irrelevant disgust images. While it is unclear how participants viewed 
these irrelevant primes, it shows that the perception of being a skilled emotion differentiator was 
associated with people making more lenient moral judgments on these trials compared to 
relevant-disgust or neutral-prime trials. Participants could be suppressing their true moral 
judgments when primed with irrelevant disgust images because they think the images have 
influenced their first reactions to the moral transgression. However, that does not explain why 
this effect was found only for those who perceived themselves to be skilled emotion 
differentiators and not for people who were actually skilled in emotion differentiation (as 
assessed with the operative measure).  
 One of the most plausible explanations for the unexpected results is the design of the new 
paradigm. I was unable to use the target behavior set that Cameron et al. (2013) used because a 
pilot study revealed participants had difficulty distinguishing between relevant and irrelevant 
disgust prime for these target behaviors. I instead used 10 harm violations and 10 purity 
violations establish in prior research and determined corresponding relevant disgust primes by 
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matching similarity in content. Given potential criticisms of these categories (Gray, Waytz, & 
Young, 2012), it could be participants did not perceive these two categories to be separate. 
Furthermore, prior research has not provided a method to determine the relevance of types of 
emotions produced by primes. With this in mind, I simply determined relevance through content 
based similarity between the prime and the target behavior. For example, if the target behavior 
was to judge whether laughing at a person with disabilities is immoral, the relevant prime image 
contained a disgusting picture of a person with a physical disability.  
 In addition, each target behavior was presented three times with different primes. I 
believe the reason the primes did not affect moral judgment was due to consistency effects from 
viewing the target behavior so often. The need for consistency is a very powerful motivator (see 
Festinger, 1962) and people are motivated to give consistent responses reflecting their moral 
beliefs. Past work does find that people will desire consistency in their moral judgments (Ditto, 
Pizarro, & Tannenbaum, 2009). Additionally, the longer duration of target behaviors on screen 
compared to past work (e.g., Cameron et al., 2013) may have allowed participants time to engage 
in response correction, which may explain the apparent contrast effects in this study.  
To investigate this, I conducted exploratory analyses to attempt to get past consistency 
effects by examining only the first instance of each target behavior. In this analysis I did find a 
priming effect, but the effect was in the opposite direction from what I predicted. Participants 
made more lenient moral judgments when target behaviors were primed with relevant disgust 
versus neutral images. During instructions, I told participants to try to avoid letting the images 
shown influence their responses because this is standard in the affect misattribution procedure. If 
the relevant images stood out more to participants as affecting their judgments, they might be 
motivated to actively regulate their emotional response or make an adjustment to their response. 
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This suggestion is similar to what was found by Schnall and colleagues (2008), who indicated 
that overt manipulations of disgust (such as having participants stick their hand in goo) were too 
salient and failed to influence moral judgments. A follow up study might try manipulating 
whether people are told to avoid being influenced by primes, or whether they believe that disgust 
responses are trustworthy. This would also establish disgust from primes as relevant or 
irrelevant, and it may be that people who are skilled at differentiating emotions can more easily 
disregard, or utilize, disgust from primes depending on task instructions.  
 The findings presented here suggest new ways to think about how to determine the 
relevance of emotions in moral judgments. Often, emotion-based models of morality assume that 
everybody experiences emotions similarly. I have shown that people do differ on their ability to 
differentiate between emotions and that the simple perception of being a skilled emotion 
differentiator might affect moral judgment. Future research on the topic of relevant emotions in 
moral judgments should take into account the limitations of my design and work to expand the 
target behavior set. By creating more target behaviors and creating a different method to 
establish relevance that might not be as salient as content-matching, researchers may be more 
successful in establishing causal claims about how emotion differentiation predicts the use of 
relevant emotions during moral judgment. Research in emotion differentiation suggests it may 
lead to better decision-making about the complex emotional world. Given the role emotions play 
in moral judgment decisions, emotion differentiation may allow for the better use of relevant 
emotions in people’s moral choices.  
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Table 1 
Means and standard deviations of moral judgments by prime type.  
Prime Type Mean Standard Deviation 
Relevant Disgust 3.03 .38 
Irrelevant Disgust 3.01 .35 
Neutral 3.02 .36 
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Table 2 
Estimated marginal means plus standard error (in parenthesis) of moral judgment by self-
reported emotion differentiation and prime type 
Emotion Differentiation Relevant Disgust Irrelevant Disgust Neutral 
Self-report - - - 
High (+1 SD) 3.13(.06) 3.01(.06) 3.14(.06) 
Low (-1 SD) 2.93(.06) 2.93(.06) 2.90(.06) 
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Table 3 
Estimated marginal means and standard error of adjusted moral judgment by prime type 
Prime Type Mean Standard Deviation 
Adjusted Relevant Disgust 2.92 .46 
Adjusted Irrelevant Disgust 2.98 .57 
Adjusted Neutral 3.10 .59 
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Appendix A 
List of target behaviors with the relevant disgust prime, organized by harm then purity violations.  
Harm Violations 
1. A person kicks a dog in the head, hard.  
 
2. A person punches a homeless man.  
 
3. A person shoots an animal from an endangered species.  
 
4. A person makes cruel remarks to an overweight person.  
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5. A person sticks a pin into the palm of a child.  
 
6. A person tries to cripple someone in a fight.  
 
7. A person hurts a defenseless animal.  
 
8. A person beats someone unconscious.  
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9. A person laughs at a man with a facial tumor.  
 
10. A person kicks a cat that is in the way.  
 
Purity Violations 
1. A person attends an art show where people roll around in their feces.  
 
2. A person gets sexual pleasure from his pet rat.  
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3. A person is sexually promiscuous. 
 
4. A person eats cloned human tissue.  
 
5. A person gropes a corpse.  
 
6. A person drinks a pint of blood.  
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7. A person has sex with a thawed chicken that he later eats.  
 
8. A person bites into an apple with a worm in it.  
 
9. A person drinks a glass of spit water.  
 
10. A person eats candy shaped like dog poop.  
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Appendix B 
Neutral prime images. 
 
